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Blog 11
James Gardner reflects on the question "Is Democracy Possible
Here?”

Blog Author: James A. Gardner, SUNY Distinguished Professor; Bridget and Thomas Black Professor;
Research Professor of Political Science, School of Law. This blog is Professor Gardner's personal
reflection.

Introduction: It has often been said of socialism that we don’t really know whether it works because it
has never been tried, and because regimes that have called themselves socialist have in fact fallen far
short of its ideals. Much the same might be said of democracy.
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It has often been said of socialism that we don’t really know whether it works because it has never been
tried, and because regimes that have called themselves socialist have in fact fallen far short of its ideals.
Much the same might be said of democracy.

The United States by no means began as a democracy. The Framers, following the classical view,

understood democracy as a kind of mob rule. Consistent with that view, Madison argued in Federalist
63 that the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity from the structure of governance
counted strongly in favor of the proposed constitution.

Public opinion, however, quickly evolved in a different direction. In the early nineteenth century, the

American public largely discarded inherited forms of social and class deference, coming to believe that

all white men were capable of good self-governance, and indeed that political virtue was far more likely
to be found in the mass of ordinary people than in the political classes. From then on, the United States
began a slow, meandering, often difficult journey toward a model of democracy that is inclusive and

broadly responsive to public opinion. Following a hard-fought movement for voting rights and powerful
interventions by the Supreme Court in the twentieth century, the country seemed to stand at the
threshold of creating the conditions in which democracy might actually be given a try.

That journey appears now to have been abandoned. Americans in 2016 elected an authoritarian

president who spent his four years in office viciously attacking and undermining the social and political
norms on which democracy rests. In the end, he rejected democracy itself as intrinsically fraudulent,

inciting his followers to attempt to subvert it altogether by open violence. Donald Trump, however, was
as much a symptom as a cause of support for democracy among Americans that has been eroding for
years. [1]

We seem to have arrived at a point where it may be reasonable to ask whether democracy is possible in

the United States, indeed, whether it is even sensible as an aspiration. Much, of course, depends on what
is meant by democracy.

The most demanding conceptions of democracy are deliberative in nature; they conceive of law as

binding only when it issues from a popular will formed through engaged public deliberation that is

inclusive, fair, and respectful, and which strives to reach consensus based on reasons all can in principle
accept. [2] The possibility of deliberation, however, presupposes the possibility of common ground, and
it is unclear in the United States today whether any such common ground exists. The 2020 election

suggests that half the country prefers inherited forms of liberal democracy, political equality, the rule of
law, constitutionalism, pluralistic politics, human rights, and so forth, while another half prefers rule by
a strongman on behalf of a true American volk, unconstrained by law or mediating and checking

institutions. It is hard to see how these two groups could be capable of compromise at all, much less one
that is grounded in a truly deliberative consensus rather than in purely instrumental realpolitik.

A less demanding conception of democracy is aggregative. On this view, deliberation is unnecessary. All
a system has to do to count as democratic is to provide citizens with an opportunity to express their

individual preferences, aggregate those preferences, and generate public policies that maximize overall

utility. However, one of the main problems with the American system of democracy is that it seems to do

a terrible job of aggregating preferences. Many are excluded in one way or another from even expressing
their preferences, and when they do, the system bundles them in such a way as to give insufficient

weight to the preferences of popular majorities. In some cases, this is due to the minoritarian character
of American institutions, such as the presidency and the Senate; in others, it seems due to an

oversensitivity to majorities of dollars rather than majorities of votes, or the preferences that votes
ostensibly represent.

A third and even less demanding conception of democracy is sociological: democracy is simply a social

practice that pleases us, and requires no further justification; it is just what we do, and if it also turns out
to be good on other grounds, so much the better. Unfortunately, even this longstanding social consensus
seems to be coming apart in the United States: many now openly reject democracy, or any recognizable
conception of it.

If even minimal versions of democracy are for the moment out of reach, where does that leave us? When
agreement is impossible, the only realistic alternative is some kind of modus vivendi. Americans of vastly
different views have worked out such arrangements before, but they have often been made on the backs
of populations of color. Southerners won’t oppose improvements to democracy in the North provided

Northerners don’t try to spread them to the South, and so on. Today, however, patience with these kinds
of deals has justifiably been exhausted.

The main difficulty at the moment appears to be reaching agreement on the basic rules of the game.

Democrats, particularly in the party’s progressive wing, wish to continue to press forward toward a
perfected democracy; Republicans, particularly those in its authoritarian wing, wish to move in the

opposite direction altogether. It is difficult to imagine a pragmatic deal that would satisfy both sides or
who would be thrown under the bus to achieve it. The right thing, of course, would be for Republicans

still committed to democracy, if any remain, to throw their party’s authoritarians under the bus, but at

present that seems to be beyond the willpower of the party’s leadership, and possibly its rank and file as
well. Under these conditions, it seems that the likely outcome, at least in the short run, is continued,

cautious circling by the combatants until their relative strength becomes clearer. Only then will they
gain a better idea of what kinds of deals they can either impose . . . or must tolerate.
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